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The paper presents concepts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) and 
Financial Storage Rights (FSRs) as key market concepts for alleviating congestion 
issues in transmission networks. These instruments are in place in markets where 
prices differ depending on the location/node due to congestions. They serve as a tool 
for transmission system operators TSO (or independent system operators; ISOs) for 
eliminating congestions by remunerating entities who make it possible. The paper 
further discusses different aspects of FTRs, which are traditional financial 
instruments used to hedge the risk of high cost occurrence associated with 
transmission congestion. By owning and trading with FTRs, through auction or via 
bilateral contracts, market participants can gain additional profit. More variable 
and uncertain power system environment, characterized by high penetration of 
renewable energy sources (RES), creates potential for storage units to assist 
TSO/ISO in maximizing social welfare through FSR. As storage has the capability 
to move energy in time, it can alleviate transmission lines congestion and create 
profit through intertemporal arbitrage (by load shifting and peak shaving) 
improving return rate of its investment. These concepts are additionally explained 
by intuitive examples showing how, when congestion occurs and TSO/ISO awards 
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Congestion management and financial transmission rights (FTRs) are key 
financial elements ensuring reliable and secure operation of power systems in 
deregulated electricity market [1]. However, the presumption of their existence is 
that markets incorporate Locational Marginal Pricing mechanisms in which prices 
differ depending on the both the location in power system and time of electricity 
production (examples of such systems are New England, North and South America 
and Nordic countries). These price differences are a result of transmission line 
congestion and FTRs are financial instruments that allow market participants to 
hedge against the extra cost caused by congestions. FTRs entitle their owners to the 
revenue collected during the congestion time, meaning market participants can buy 
or sell this right for any line in the transmission grid in order to avoid congestion 
and at the same time maximize their own profit. The FTR owners receive payments 
based on price differences between two nodes for which the right is bought. As the 
prices can vary, FTRs protect their owners from price volatility and provide them 
trading at the price agreed in contracts.  
In power systems with larger integration of renewable energy sources, new 
challenges arise when it comes to power system operation and participant behavior 
[2]. This is where energy storage can find its business case, by enhancing power 
system flexibility, efficiency and reliability [3]. From the market perspective, 
transmission lines move power spatially while energy storage has the additional 
capability to move power forward also in time; this is called energy arbitrage [4]. 
Storage units have high initial investment costs and low marginal operating costs. 
Using storage only for one service highly underestimates their value and does not 
justify investments in such units. Financial storage rights (FSRs) are seen as a 
potential service to increase storage profitability; the same way market participants 
hedge against the congestion and price volatility in transmission lines with FTRs, 
they can also hedge against congestion by utilizing storage units and maximize 
revenues through provision of additional services. 
The paper is organized as follows; Section 2 gives a general overview of 
different market principles and transmission rights pricing, explaining the main 
concepts and differences between market set-ups. Section 3 explains the concept of 
Financial Transmission Rights and mathematical modelling background supported 
with examples. Section 4 explains Energy Storage Rights  with auction examples. 
Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
 




2. LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICING 
 
2.1. Pricing transmission congestion 
 
There are three different methods for pricing in transmission system: 
locational or nodal pricing, zonal pricing and uniform pricing. In locational pricing, 
the price of electricity at each bus reflects the marginal cost of providing electricity 
at that location. It is used in the USA, South America, New England and Nordic 
countries. It maximizes social welfare considering transmission and generators 
constraints, as well as losses in the power system and is performed by the system 
operator. If the system is not congested all prices are equal, however if the 
transmission line is congested or there is a loss of a transmission line, nodal prices 
will differ by location. These locational prices are based on the principles of 
economic dispatch. Transmission congestion prevents energy from low-cost 
generators from meeting all load requirements and, consequently, from clearing the 
market. This means that low-cost generators dispatch will be constrained to lower 
power output values (or even shut down) and higher-cost generators will be 
dispatched to serve load and will thereby raise the market price.  
Zonal pricing is similar to locational pricing. Several buses are grouped into 
zones and there are price differences between the zones. Prices are calculated from 
simplified models. Zonal pricing implies higher operating cost [5]. When uniform 
pricing is used and location is neglected social welfare is often reduced even if the 
transmission is not congested, which can give incorrect investment signals in the 
long term [6].  
 
2.2. Locational Marginal Prices 
 
Prices are determined by generator bids for producing energy. If there is no 
congestion, the charge for using transmission lines is zero and marginal prices at all 
nodes are the same (this does not include charges for using transmission grid for 
transferring electricity). However, in case of congestions the transmission network 
usage charges are defined as the incremental cost of redispatch that satisfies 
transmission lines limit. This means that if transmission lines are congested, some 
low-cost generators will have to be replaced by more expensive generators resulting 
in higher marginal prices. Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) values are calculated 
for different time periods and are a result of the optimization process which finds 
least cost dispatch while maintaining production consumption equilibrium and 
satisfies all system technical constraints [7]. There are many factors that affect 
LMPs: the electrical characteristics of the system, generators’ bid prices, generators’ 
limit, the transmission system elements that are experiencing congestion (line 
thermal limit) and the losses in the system (if they are taken in the account) [8]. 
The calculation process combines shadow prices of transmission system constraints 
with the impact on transmission constraints due to supplying additional load at a 




bus to determine the LMPs values. In short, LMPs can be defined as “the price of 
supplying an additional MW of load at each location (bus) in the system. [9]” This 
results in generators selling energy at one price (the price calculated for that 
location) and suppliers (or consumers) buying energy at a different price because of 
congestion and differences in LMPs. As a way of protecting buyers from price 
volatility efficient mechanisms such as FTRs are put in place to deal with 
congestions in transmission system. 
 
 
3. FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHTS 
 
FTRs are used to mitigate market participants’ exposure to price risks when 
congestion occurs in transmission network, they are a financial entitlement used for 
hedging against congestion charges. The economic value of an FTR is determined by 
the difference in the hourly locational marginal prices between its source and sink 
and by the MW reservation level of the financial transmission right. The FTR is 
independent of actual energy delivery since its value is determined by the 
reservation MW [10]. The marginal cost of energy (energy component of LMP) has 
the same value throughout the system. On the other hand, values of loss and 
congestion components may vary from one location to another. The congestion 
component of the LMP is calculated as a congestion difference between sink and 
source location (bus), while the difference between loss components of sink and 
source LMPs determines the loss component of the LMP differences. However, 
currently FTRs are determined only according to the congestion components of LMP 
differences. Energy component of the LMP differential is always zero. This is 
because the energy component of the LMP at a certain location is always the same 
as that at any other location [11].  
When losses are neglected, nodal price difference reflects the existence of 
transmission constraints or transmission congestion (1):  
∆𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗#(1)  
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗 is price difference in congestion cost between bus 𝑖𝑖 and bus 𝑗𝑗. 
FTRs can be acquired through four market mechanisms: Long-term FTR 
Auctions, Annual FTR Auction, Monthly FTR Auction or FTR Secondary market. 
 
3.1. Obligation and Option 
 
There are two different types of Financial Transmission Rights: obligation 
and option. The hourly economic value of FTR Obligation is based on the MW 
reservation and the price difference between sink (point of delivery) and the source 
point (point of receipt). The hourly economic value of an FTR Obligation is positive 
(a benefit) when the path designated in the FTR is in the same direction as the 




congested flow. This occurs when the price at the sink point is higher than the price 
at the source point. An FTR Obligation is negative (a liability) if the designated 
path is in the direction opposite of the congested flow (price at the source point is 
higher than the price at the sink source), as shown in Figure 1.a) and 1.b). Since 
FTR payoff is related to LMP differences, potential FTR owners will try to forecast 
LMP in order to choose FTR injection and withdrawal locations with only positive 
payoff. 
 
Figure 1 a) FTR as a benefit b) FTR as a liability [12] 
The hourly economic value of an FTR Option is based on the FTR MW 
reservation and the price difference between sink point (point of delivery) and the 
source point (point of receipt). The hourly economic value of an FTR Option can only 
be positive. This occurs when path designated in the FTR is in the same direction as 
the congested flow. When the designated path is in the direction opposite to the 
congested flow the economic value of an FTR Option is zero.  
FTR is a financial instrument. The payment ISO collects from congestion 
charges will be allocated to the FTR owners regardless if they actually use the 
transmission lines or not. Payment is independent of real physical power transfer 
since it is based on reservation of MW for specified lines. 
 
3.2. Mathematical background for calculating FTRs 
 
DC optimal power flow method is used to calculate minimal cost of generation 
and financial transmission rights. The goal is to minimize generators cost functions 
for meeting the load (2):  







where 𝐺𝐺 is the set of all generators in the system, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 �𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖� is generator cost 
function for generator at node 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 is the amount of power produced by the 
generator at the node 𝑖𝑖.  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is nodal price for node 𝑖𝑖 (dual variable). The power injected in the node or 
withdrawn from the node 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is equal to sum of all power flows on the transmission 
lines 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 that start (end) at that node (3):  
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖:  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
#(3)  
Generators have lower 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚and upper  𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  power limit (4): 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚#(4)  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the dual variable for line shadow price. Power flow on each 
transmission line is constrained by thermal capacity 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  (5): 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗:  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗#(5)  
The complementarity conditions enforce that the inner product of an 
inequality constraint and the primal or dual variable is zero, and the nonnegativity 
of both the inequality constraint and primal or dual variable. This means that 
either the inequality constraint holds as an equality, i.e. is binding, or the primal or 
dual variable is zero. If  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 < 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, then the dual variable for shadow price 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is 
equal to zero. If 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, then the value of 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is greater than zero and that is 
the value for financial transmission right [13]. 
 
3.3. 3-bus example 
 
There are two generators in the system, one located at the bus 1 with 
marginal cost 10 €/MWh and the other at the bus 2 with marginal cost 20€/MWh. 
Load is located at the bus 3. Transmission lines capacity between two nodes are 40 
MW and the impedances are equal for all three lines. Nodal price can be a 
combination of two marginal costs of generators and it can be lower than the 
cheapest generator’s marginal cost and higher than the most expensive marginal 
cost. The system is shown in Figure 2: 
Generator 𝐺𝐺1 and 𝐺𝐺2 each have the capacity of 100 MW. In the first case 
example, load at the bus 3 is equal to 55 MW. The power flow and nodal prices are 
calculated in MATLAB. The best solution for this case is to dispatch generator 𝐺𝐺1 
for serving the load at the bus 3. Transmission line constraints are not violated. 
Nodal price is 10€/MWh at each bus.  
 





Figure 2 3-bus system 
In the second case load is increased by 5 MW. Generator 𝐺𝐺1 produces 60 MW 
and nodal prices are not unique in the entire system. Nodal price at bus 1 is 10 
€/MWh, at bus 2 is 20€/MWh and at bus 3 is 30€/MWh. Increasing the load for 1 
MW at bus 1 can be served by Generator 𝐺𝐺1. If load at bus 3 is increased for 1 MW, 
generator 𝐺𝐺2 must increase its power production for 2 MW and generator 𝐺𝐺1 must 
decrease the power generation by 1 MW. That is the reason why the nodal price at 
bus 3 is 30€/MWh. Generator’s profit at the bus 1 is 10€/MWh*60MW*1h=600€. 
The load has to pay 30€/MWh*60MW*1h=1800€. The difference between 
generators’ profit and consumers’ cost is collected by the system operator. The FTR 
price for transmission line between bus 1 and bus 3 is 30 €/MWh. If that price is 
multiplied by amount of power transferred over that line (40 MW), 1200 € revenue 
is collected for consumer at bus 3. If the consumer at bus 3 buys the FTR from bus 1 
to bus 3, he can hedge against the price volatility. 
 
3.4. IEEE 9-bus example without congestion 
 
9-bus example is shown in Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3 9-bus example 




The generators’ cost function, transmission line limits and reactance are 
given in Table I and Table II: 
Table I Generators’ cost function 
   Generator Cost function (€) 
G1 0.11p2 +5p+150 
G2 0.085p2+1.2p+600 
G3 0.1225p2 +1p+335 
 
where 𝑝𝑝 is the amount of produced power in MW. 
Table II Transmission line characteristics 
Line   From To  Reactance (p.u.) 
Limit 
(MW)   
1 1 4 0.0576 250   
2 2 8 0.0625 250   
3 3 6 0.0586 300   
4 4 5 0.092 250   
5 4 9 0.085 250   
6 5 6 0.17 150   
7 6 7 0.1008 60   
8 7 8 0.072 250   
9 8 9 0.161 250   
 
Load is located at buses 5, 7 and 9, as shown in Figure 3, and the generators are 
located at buses 1, 2 and 3. The objective is to minimize the generation cost considering 
transmission line limits. In the first example, 90 MW load is located at bus 5, 100 MW 
load at bus 7 and 125 MW load at bus 9, as shown in Table III. After running the 
optimization algorithm, the minimum cost of supplying the load in the system is 
5216.03 € and generators are dispatched as shown in Table III: 
Table III Load and generators’ production 
Load bus Load (MW) Gen bus Gen (MW) 
5 90 1 86.56 
7 100 2 134.38 
9 125 3 94.06 
 
The system is operating within technical limits and constraints and prices 
are equal at every bus (24.04 €). 
Power flow on each line and comparison with thermal line limits is shown in 
Table IV: 




Table IV Power flow compared to line limit 
Line From To Limit (MW) Power flow (MW) 
1 1 4 250 86.5614 
2 2 8 250 134.3633 
3 3 6 300 94.0753 
4 4 5 250 33.7322 
5 4 9 250 52.8292 
6 5 6 150 -56.2678 
7 6 7 60 37.8075 
8 7 8 250 -62.1925 
9 8 9 250 72.1708 
 
3.5. IEEE 9-bus example with congestion  
 
Load is increased in all buses of the system. Loads at the buses 5,7 and 9 are 
155 MW, 190 MW and 200 MW, respectively. The production cost is 12619.1 € and 
the generators dispatch is shown in Table V: 
Table V Load and generators dispatch for constrained case 
Load bus Load (MW) Gen bus Gen (MW) 
5 155 1 157.14 
7 190 2 243.96 
9 200 3 143.90 
Figure 4 shows absolute value of power flow in constrained case. 
Thermal limit on line 7 is enforced: 
 


















This results in different nodal prices as shown in Table VI: 
Table VI Nodal prices 










After the optimization process, shadow price for the constrained line is 8.6095 
€/MW. Every participant who requested the FTR for that line will be paid 
8.6095€/MW times reserved amount of MW.  
Market participants can hedge against the price differences or make profit by 
owning FTRs. Next section demonstrates maximization of revenue from owning the 
FTR through auctions. 
 
3.6. Auction model 
 
The main goal of auction process is maximizing ISO profit. Bidders make 
offers of lower and upper amount of MW they are willing to buy and the price they 
are willing to pay. There are 3 types of FTRs that can be bought in an auction: flow-
based financial transmission option or flowgate rights (in this case presented as 
bidder 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), point-to-point financial transmission obligation (presented as 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) and 
point-to-point financial transmission option (presented as 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖). Market participants 
develop a bidding strategy by calculating the flowgate capacity required by their 
transaction and often change the bid price or quantity required to adjust their 
portfolios. Willing to obtain more rights or trying to get a better price for desired 
right, bidders attempt to eliminate other markets participants, as explained later in 
3.7. The auction model is taken from [14].  
The objective is presented as (6): max�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) + �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) + �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
#(6)  
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 are required amount of MW in auction for flowgate right, 
point-to-point obligation and point-to-point option, respectively and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖), 
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖) and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖)  are prices that bidders are willing to pay for a certain right.  
Constraints are lower and upper bounds of required MW (7): 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖  ,∀i, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ a, b, c #(7)  




There is also constraint connected with flowgate limit on every line in each 
direction (the FTR flow on the same line does not have to be equal for both 
directions). This can be described by equation (8) and described as: 
�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + �𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + �𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙#(8)  
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖, 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 are required quantities of MW in auction for flowgate right, 
point-to-point obligation and point-to-point option, respectively. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 are 
coefficients that determine power flow for flowgate right, point-to-point obligation 
and point-to-point option.  
3-bus system is shown in Figure 5 with equal transmission line reactance of 
𝑋𝑋 = 1 p.u. for all lines and thermal line limits of 100 MW: 
 
Figure 5 3-bus system and thermal limits 
When bidder 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 is willing to buy a flowgate right for certain line and 
direction, his coefficient for that flowgate will be 1 and for the other lines 0. 
Flowgate or flow based option is an option for a line in specified direction. As one 
can see in Table VII bidder 𝑎𝑎1 is willing to buy the right for flowgate 1->3, bidder 𝑎𝑎2 
is willing to buy the right for flowgate 3->2 and bidder 𝑎𝑎3 is willing to buy the right 
for flowgate 3->1. Bidder 𝑏𝑏1 is buying point-to-point obligation from node 1 to node 
3. As it is a point-to-point obligation, there is negative Power Transfer Distribution 
Factor (PTDF) on opposite direction. This means if required FTR is in the same 
direction as congested flow, he will receive payment, and if it is in opposite direction 
he has to pay the ISO. If he injected 1 MW of power in node 1 and extract it from 
node 3, that will increase a power flow on line 1->3 by 2/3 MW (in opposite direction 
-2/3 MW), on line 1->2 and 2->3 by 1/3 MW (with negative sign in opposite 
directions). Bidder 𝑐𝑐1 is willing to buy a point-to-pont option from node 1 to node 2. 
As he is buying an option, there is just a positive sign because if required FTR is in 
opposite direction as the congested flow, he does not have to pay the ISO anything. 
Injecting 1 MW at node 1 and extracting from node 2 will cause a power flow of 2/3 
MW on the line 1->2 and 1/3 MW on the lines 3->2 and 1->3. 
 




Table VII Flowgate and PTDFs factors for each bid 
Flowgate Bidder a1 Bidder a2 Bidder a3 Bidder b1 Bidder c1 
1->2 0 0 0 1/3 2/3 
2->1 0 0 0 -1/3 0 
2->3 0 0 0 1/3 0 
3->2 0 1 0 -1/3 1/3 
1->3 1 0 0 2/3 1/3 
3->1 0 0 1 -2/3 0 
 
Lower bounds are FTRs that bidders already own and do not want to trade 
with. Bidding prices, lower and upper bound of required FTRs are given in Table 
VIII: 
Table VIII Bidding prices, lower and upper bounds of FTRs 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 c1 
Bid (€/MW) 4 7 8 10 5 
Lower bound (MW) 0 0 50 20 0 
Upper bound (MW) 100 100 100 80 50 
After the auction, comparing the line limits with power flow in Table IX, one 
can notice that flowgate 1->3 is congested and the shadow price is 4€/MW (given 
later in the section). 
Table IX Line limit, actual power flow and shadow prices 
Line Line limit (MW) Power flow (MW) Shadow price (€/MW) 
1->2 100 60 0 
2->1 100 -26.6667 0 
2->3 100 26.6667 0 
3->2 100 90 0 
1->3 100 100 4 
3->1 100 46.6667 0 
 
Awarded FTRs, upper bound of required FTRs and ISO revenue from auction are 
given in Table X: 
Table X Awarded FTRs and ISO receipt 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 c1 
Upper bound (MW) 100 100 100 80 50 
Awarded MW 30 100 100 80 50 
ISO revenue (€) 120 0 0 213.33 66.67 
 




As one can notice from Table X, ISO revenue depends on bidding prices and 
MW awarded to each bidder. The main goal of the auction is to maximize the profit 
taking into account transmission line limit. As shown in Table IX, thermal limit of 
line 1->3 is violated and shadow price for that line is not 0. Shadow prices depend 
on the latest bid which could not be awarded. For example, we can notice that 
bidder 𝑎𝑎1 got 30 MW (and he was willing to buy 100 MW). His bidding price was 4 
€/MW for flowgate 1->3. After the auction, the shadow price for flowgate 1->3 is 4 
€/MW because this is the last bid that could not be awarded (he could not get the 
required amount because of congestion, his price reflected the shadow price for that 
flowgate). 
Bidders have to be careful in auction process. For example, bidder 𝑎𝑎1 wanted 
to buy 100 MW for flow gate 1->3. As that flowgate is very valuable, he pays dearly 
for his 30 MW because this flowgate is also very valuable to other bidders. In next 
hour auction bidder 𝑎𝑎1 can change his strategy and bid only for 30 MW and if others 
do not change their strategy, he would get 30 MW of that right. However, now the 
shadow price will be 0 and he would not have to pay anything for holding that right 
because there are no more rights that have to be awarded for that flowgate.  
As it can be seen in Table X, bidders 𝑎𝑎2 and 𝑎𝑎3 do not have to pay the ISO for 
awarded FTRs because there are more rights available. This can also be subject to 
changes in next hour auction. Flowgates 3->2 and 3->1 can become more valuable 
and price can change.  
Bidders 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑐𝑐1 have to pay for holding the congested flowgate 1->3 
depending on the PTDFs factor. Bidder 𝑏𝑏1 has to pay 80 MW*2/3*4€/MW=213.33 € 
and bidder 𝑐𝑐1 50 MW*1/3*4 €/MW=66.67 €.  
Bidder 𝑎𝑎1 could not get the full 100 MW for his right since his bidding price 
was too low. As ISO objective is to maximize the profit from auction, and bidders 𝑏𝑏1 
and 𝑐𝑐1 had higher prices, they are the first to be awarded their FTRs.  
If bidder 𝑏𝑏1 changes his bid price (e.g. from 10€/MW to 2€/MW wishing to pay 
less for FTRs) situation will change as shown in Table XI and XII: 
Table XI Changes in awarded FTRs and ISO receipt 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 c1 
Awarded MW 50 100 100 50 50 
ISO revenue (€) 200 200 0 100 100 
Previous awarded MW 30 100 100 80 50 
Previous ISO revenue (€) 120 0 0 213.33 66.67 
 
Table XII Changes in power flow and shadow prices 
Line Line limit (MW) Power flow (MW) Shadow price (€/MW) 
1->2 100 50 0 
2->1 100 -16.6667 0 
2->3 100 16.6667 0 
3->2 100 100 2 
1->3 100 100 4 
3->1 100 66.6667 0 




ISO would award more MW to bidder 𝑎𝑎1 since this would increase its profit. 
As one can notice, shadow prices and power flow changed as well.  
 
3.7. Bidder 𝒂𝒂𝟏𝟏 strategy for awarding more MW 
 
Bidder 𝑎𝑎1 would like to gain more than 50 MW of FTR on line 1->3. To 
achieve this, he can chooses from different strategies. His first option would be 
rising his bidding price from 4 €/MW to 7€/MW. The choice of 7€/MW follows from 
the logic of  6€/ MW being sufficient only for awarding him 50 MW, as shown in the 
previous case. The shadow price for flowgate 1->3 is 6€/MW and ISO receives 300€ 
from bidder 𝑎𝑎1, 200€ from bidder 𝑏𝑏1 and 100€ from bidder 𝑐𝑐1. Rising his price to 
7€/MW, he gets 70 MW for flowgate 1->3. At the same time ISO reduces FTRs to the 
bidder 𝑏𝑏1 from 50 MW to 20 MW. The shadow price for flowgate 1->3 is now 7€/MW 
and ISO receives 490 € from bidder 𝑎𝑎1, 93.33 € from bidder 𝑏𝑏1 and 116.67€ from 
bidder 𝑐𝑐1. 
Second choice for bidder 𝑎𝑎1 is to buy the FTR for different flowgate and try to 
eliminate other market players. He wants to buy 70 MW for flowgate 1->2 (this bid 
is presented as 𝑎𝑎4). Choosing the right bidding price is the most important if he 
chooses this strategy. He bids 4€/MW for flowgate 1->3 (as he did in previous 
auction) and he bids 3€/MW for flowgate 1->2. This bid is too low to eliminate other 
market participants and he cannot get more than 50 MW for the flowgate 1->3 (it is 
still more profitable for ISO to award more MW to bidders 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑐𝑐1). This means he 
has to give a higher bid of 4€/MW. Results of the auction and payments to the ISO 
compared to the previous case are given in Table XIII: 
Table XIII Compared awarded MW and payment to ISO 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 c1 
Awarded MW (case 1) 70 90 100 - 20 50 
Payment to ISO (€) 490 490 0 - 46.67 233.33 
Awarded  MW (case 2) 70 100 100 70 30 30 
Payment to ISO (€) 280 500 0 210 80 150 
 
As the results show, better strategy for a bidder is to participate in auctions 
by bidding for different rights instead of increasing the bid for the same right. As 
opposed to the previous example, now bidder 𝑎𝑎1 is awarded 70 MW for the flowgate 
1->3 and he needs to pay 280 € for holding that FTR, instead of 490 €. He could 
additionally make more profit by selling the right for flowgate 1->2 through 
bilateral contract if he does not need that right. By choosing the right bidding price 
for the flowgate 1->2, he was awarded more MW for the flowgate 1->3 and paid less 
for it. The shadow prices for the flowgates 1->2, 3->2 and 1->4 are 3€/MW, 5€/MW 
and 4 €/MW, respectively. 
 




3.8. Rising shadow prices 
 
Assume that the second scenario explained in section 3.7. occurs. Only 
flowgates 3->2 and 1->3 are congested and shadow prices are 2€/MW and 4€/MW. 
Shadow price for flowgate 2->3 is 0 which means there are more rights on that 
flowgate that can be awarded. Only bidder 𝑏𝑏1 is holding point-to-point obligation for 
that flowgate. The flowgate is 16.67 MW and there is additional 83.33 MW that can 
be awarded. If new bidder wants to buy flow-based option for flowgate 2->3, 
regardless the price he offers, he can get a maximum of 93.33 MW. This comes from 
the fact that bidder’s 𝑏𝑏1 lower bound is 20 MW (20*1/3=6.667 MW) and does not 
want to trade with that amount. Depending on the price and the upper bound of 
required amount of MW offered by new bidder for flowgate 2->3, flowgates, awarded 
FTRs and shadow prices change. Table XIV presents shadow prices and power flow 
on flowgates when bidding price for flow-based option 2->3 is 4€/MW and required 
upper bound is 80 MW. Compared to the previous case, shadow prices are still the 
same for flowgate 3->2 and 1->3 (2€/MW and 4 €/MW). Power flow changed only on 
the flow gate 2->3 and is increased by 80 MW. 
Table XIV Shadow prices and power flow for bidding price 4€/MW and upper bound 
80 MW 
Flow gate Shadow price (€/MW) Power flow (MW) 
1->2 0 50 
2->1 0 -16.667 
2->3 0 96.667 
3->2 2 100 
1->3 4 100 
3->1 0 66.667 
 
If the new bidder increases his required upper bound up to 100 MW and the 
price remains the same (4€/MW), he will be rewarded 83.33 MW (others get the 
same amount as in previous case), but his upper bound reflects the shadow prices, 
as shown in Table XV: 
Table XV Shadow prices and power flow for bidding price 4€/MW and upper bound 
1000 MW 
Flow gate Shadow price (€/MW) Power flow (MW) 
1->2 0 50 
2->1 0 -16.667 
2->3 4 100 
3->2 6 100 
1->3 4 100 
3->1 0 66.667 
 




If the new bidder wants more MW, he should rise his price. Shadow prices 
and power flow, when the price is 5€/MW and upper bound 100 MW, is shown in 
Table XVI: 
Table XV Shadow prices and power flow for bidding price 5€/MW and upper bound 
1000 MW 
Flow gate Shadow price (€/MW) Power flow (MW) 
1->2 0 40 
2->1 0 -6.667 
2->3 4 100 
3->2 7 100 
1->3 5 100 
3->1 0 86.667 
 
This also changes the awarded MW for bidders as shown in Table XVII 
(second and third column presents the situation when bidding price is 4€/MW and 
5€/MW, and the upper bound is 100 MW): 
Table XVII Differences in awarded MW depending on different bidding price 
Bidder Awarded MW Awarded MW 
a1 50 70 
a2 100 90 
a3 100 100 
a4 83.333 93.333 
b1 50 20 
c1 50 50 
The new bidder will receive 93.333 MW, which is maximum since bidder 𝑏𝑏1 
already owns 6.667 MW for the specified flowgate. His bidding price changed 
awarded FTRs to bidders 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2 and 𝑏𝑏1. As one can notice, this can also be a good 
strategy for bidder 𝑎𝑎1 if he wants to get more MW for flowgate 1->3. If bidder 𝑎𝑎1 
request 100 MW for flowgate 2->3 at the price 5€/MW or higher, he will get 70 MW 
on the flowgate 1->3. As the shadow price is 5€/MW, he needs to pay 350 € for 70 
MW and 373.33€ for 93.333 MW on the flowgate 2->3. This is a suboptimal case is 
compared to the one described in section 3.8. On the other hand, if he would choose 
to sell the right for flowgate 2->3 via bilateral contract, there is an opportunity to 
increase the profit and still get 70 MW for flowgate 1->3. 
 
3.9. FTR auction in 6 bus system 
 
Line parameters are obtained from [15] and shown in Table XVIII.  




Table XVIII Line parameters 6 bus system 
Line From bus To bus X (p.u.) Flow limit (MW) 
1 1 2 0.20 100 
2 1 4 0.20 100 
3 1 5 0.30 100 
4 2 3 0.25 60 
5 2 4 0.10 60 
6 2 5 0.30 60 
7 2 6 0.20 60 
8 3 5 0.26 60 
9 3 6 0.10 60 
10 4 5 0.40 60 
11 5 6 0.30 60 
6-bus system is given in Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6 6-bus system [15] 
Generators’ cost function is a quadratic function given in Table XIX, as well as 
lower and upper bound: 
Table XVIII Generators’ parameters 
Generator Pmin (MW) Pmax (MW) Cost function 
1 50 200 213.1+11.669p1+0.00533p12 
2 37.5 150 200.0+10.333p2+0.00889p22 
3 45 180 240.0+10.833p3+0.00741p32 
where 𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2, 𝑝𝑝3 are power produced by generator at bus 1,2 and 3, 
respectively. Load at the bus 4,5 and 6 is 80 MW, 90 MW and 70 MW. Generator at 
the bus 1 produces 50 MW, generator at bus 2 produces 101.696 MW and generator 




at the bus 3 produces 88.304 MW. Thermal line limits are not violated and nodal 
prices are the same all over the network 12.14€/MWh. 
If the demand increases, congestion will occur and the nodal price will be 
different depending on nodes. Assume there is 120 MW, 120 MW and 100 MW load 
at buses 4,5 and 6. Lines 5 (between bus 2 and 4) and 9 (between bus 3 and 6) are 
congested and nodal prices are different. Shadow prices for congested lines are 3.86 
€/MW and 1.59€/MW. ISO collects 327.10 € for transmission congestion.  
If participants want to hedge against price volatility, they can buy flow based 
option, firm point-to-point option or obligation. As lines 5 and 9 are congested, 
market participants compete to buy rights for those lines. Bidder 𝑎𝑎1 wants to buy 
flow based option for flow gate 2->4; his bidding price is 3.5 €/MW and maximum 
bound of FTR he is willing to buy is 10 MW. Bidder 𝑎𝑎2 competes for flowgate3->6 
with the bidding price 1.5 €/MW and upper bound 15 MW. They chose their prices 
according to the shadow prices in congested system. If they make bids with higher 
prices they can get more rights, but also they cawilln pay more than the right is 
worth. Bidders 𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑏𝑏2 are buying point-to-point obligation (𝑏𝑏1 from bus 2 to 4 and 
bidder 𝑏𝑏2 from bus 3 to 6). Upper bounds for both are 60 MW and bidding prices are 
2€/MW and 3€/MW. Flow based options and calculated PTDFs are shown in Table 
XX: 
Table XIX Flow based options and PTDFs for auction 
Flowgate Bidder a1 Bidder a2 Bidder b1 Bidder b2 
1->2 0 0 -0.1555 +0.004 
2->1 0 0 +0.1555 -0.004 
1->4 0 0 +0.1895 +0.001 
4->1 0 0 -0.1895 -0.001 
1->5 0 0 -0.0337 -0.005 
5->1 0 0 +0.0337 +0.005 
2->3 0 0 +0.0384 -0.1508 
3->2 0 0 -0.0384 +0.1508 
2->4 1 0 +0.69 -0.006 
4->2 0 0 -0.69 +0.006 
2->5 0 0 +0.07 -0.0077 
5->2 0 0 -0.07 +0.0077 
2->6 0 0 +0.045 +0.1675 
6->2 0 0 -0.045 -0.1675 
3->5 0 0 +0.0438 +0.1362 
5->3 0 0 -0.0438 -0.1362 
3->6 0 1 -0.006 +0.7120 
6->3 0 0 +0.006 -0.7120 
4->5 0 0 -0.12 -0.0043 
5->4 0 0 +0.12 +0.0043 
5->6 0 0 -0.04 +0.1193 
6->5 0 0 +0.04 -0.1193 




After the auction, ISO awards maximum amount to every bidder. Shadow 
prices are 0 because there are more rights that can be awarded and none of them 
has to pay for awarded FTRs. Bidder 𝑎𝑎1 gets 10 MW and receives 38.6 € for holding 
the FTR for flow gate 2->4. Bidder 𝑎𝑎2 gets 15 MW and receives 23.85 €. Bidder 𝑏𝑏1 
gets for flow gate 2->4 41.4 MW and 159.80 €. Bidder 𝑏𝑏2 gets 42.7 MW for flow gate 
3->6 and 67.92 €.  
If in the next auction bidders 𝑎𝑎1 and 𝑎𝑎2 will try to get more FTRs, meaning 
they will rise their upper bound to e.g. 30 MW. ISO awards them 30 MW and 17.564 
MW. Bidder 𝑏𝑏1 gets 44 MW and bidder 𝑏𝑏2 gets 60 MW. Shadow prices for flow gates 
2->4 and 3->6 are 2.91 €/MW and 1.5 €/MW. Bidder 𝑎𝑎1pays 87.35 € (30 MW at the 
price 2.91 €/MW) and receives 115.80 € for holding the FTR (30 MW multiplied by 
3.86 €/MW). Bidder 𝑎𝑎2 pays 26.32 € and receives 27.90 €. Bidder 𝑏𝑏1 pays 88.35€ and 
gets 117.19 €. Bidder 𝑏𝑏2 pays 64.08 € and gets 67.92€. 
 
 
4. ENERGY STORAGE 
 
Utilizing electricity storage flexibility can increase the reliability of supply for 
the consumers, especially with the increased integration of renewable energy 
sources characterized by limited controllability and predictability. Flexibility is the 
ability to provide upward and downward power adjustments to deal with short-term 
imbalances between generation and consumption of electric energy. This flexibility 
can be provided by flexible generation and consumption and electricity storage, but 
can also be activated in neighboring regions through interconnection capacity and 
by further integration of adjacent markets [16]. Electricity storage has the ability to 
compensate temporary power surpluses and shortages by decoupling the generation 
of electric energy from its consumption over time. The extent of this ability is 
limited by storage capacity. Although there is an increasing need for flexibility, 
market participants are incentivized to integrate new flexible resources only if the 
investment is profitable. 
 
4.1. Financial storage rights 
 
Model for calculating Financial Storage Rights is obtained from [6]. System is 
modeled with multiperiod DC optimal power flow. The objective is to minimize the 
intertemporal production cost. Constraints and dual variables are given in (9): 
𝛌𝛌𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ∶  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 = ��𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙� + �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
#(9)  
Where 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡 is nodal price for bus 𝑖𝑖 in the time 𝑡𝑡. Power 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡  injected in the bus 
or withdrawn from bus  𝑖𝑖 is equal to sum of all power flow on the transmission lines 




that start (end) at that bus plus power charged into storage 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗, 𝑡𝑡   or discharged 
from storage 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 𝑗𝑗, 𝑡𝑡 (of course only if storage is installed at that bus).  
All generators have lower 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 and upper 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 power limit, modelled by (10): 
𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  #(10)  
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 is dual variable for line shadow price of line between buses 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. Power 
flow on each transmission line is constrained by thermal capacity, modelled by (11): 
µ𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 ∶  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗#(11)  
State of charge of storage 𝑖𝑖 (SoCi,t+1) in the time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is equal to state of 
charge 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 in previous time step 𝑡𝑡 and reduced by leakage coefficient 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, plus 
charging (𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙)  reduced by charge loss coefficient 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖+ and discharging 
(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙) reduced by discharge loss coefficient η𝑖𝑖− (12): 
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙+1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖+ ∙ 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 + η𝑖𝑖− ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 #(12)  
Storage state-of-charge at the beginning and at the end of the day is the 
same, as modelled by (13): 
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,0 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,24 = 0#(13)  
Charging 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙  and discharging 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 are constrained by charge 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙  and discharge rate limits 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 (14) and (15): 
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
+: 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 #(14)  
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
−:𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≥ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙#(15)  
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
+ and 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖−are dual variables for charging and discharging. If storage is 
charged or discharged at the maximum rate,  𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 = 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙  or 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 = 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙, dual variables 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖+and 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖−and are grater then 0. If 
congestion occurs, the owner of a power capacity right (PCR) collects 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖+ ∙ 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚����������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 −
𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖
− ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚��������������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙. 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚����������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙and 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚��������������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 are quantities of power that power capacity right 
owner has.  
Charging is always positive, meaning 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙  has positive values as 
modelled by (16). Discharging is negative and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙  is a negative values 
(17). 
𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0 #(16)  
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≤ 0 #(17)  
State of charge 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖, 𝑡𝑡  is constrained by storage capacity 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙   (18): 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ∶  𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆_𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙#(18)  
State of charge is always grater or equal to zero (19): 
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ≥ 0#(19)  




𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 is dual variable for energy capacity right. If storage is congested  𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 =
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆_𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 is greater than 0 and owner of energy capacity right collects 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ∙ 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆�����𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 . 
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆�����𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 is the quantity of energy that owner of the energy capacity rights owns 
and it has to be less than 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆_𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 . 
Together, power capacity right and energy capacity right are financial 
storage rights. If the owner of storage rights has right for power and energy and if 
congestion occurs in storage, he will collect 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖+ ∙ 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚����������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 − 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖− ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚��������������𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙+𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙 ∙
𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆�����𝑖𝑖,𝑙𝑙. 
 
4.2. 3-bus system with one energy storage 
 
A 3-bus system, as shown in Figure 2, is analyzed. All transmission lines have 
the same reactance 𝑋𝑋 = 1 𝑝𝑝.𝑢𝑢. and thermal limit of 60 MW. Generators are located at 
the bus 1 and 2. Generator costs are 10€/MWh and 20€/MWh. Load and storage are 
located at bus 3. Energy storage is characterized as follow: capacity of storage is 18 
MWh, charge and discharge rate limits are 10 MW and 9 MW, charge loss coefficient is 
0.95 and discharge loss coefficient is 1/0.85. Energy leakage coefficient is 0.9. We 
consider the case with 6-time periods. Results are shown in Table XXI, Table XXII and 
Table XXIII: 
Table XXI  Generation, load, charging, discharging, state of charge 
Time (h) G1 (MW) G2(MW) Load(MW) Charge(MW) Discharge (MW) SoC (MWh) 
1 30 0 20 10 0 9.5 
2 77.2675 25.4650 110 0 -7.2675 0 
3 59.9415 0 50 9.9415 0 9.4444 
4 80 0 70 10 0 18 
5 69 42 120 0 -9 5.6118 
6 74.2930 31.4140 110 0 -4.2930 0 
 
Table XXII Nodal prices 
Time (h) Bus 1 (€/MWh) Bus 2 (€/MWh) Bus 3 (€/MWh) 
1 10 10 10 
2 10 20 30 
3 10 10 10 
4 10 10 10 
5 10 20 30 
6 10 20 30 
 
 




Table XXII Power flow 
Time (h) Line 12 (MW) Line 23 (MW) Line 13 (MW) 
1 10 10 20 
2 17.2675 42.7325 60 
3 19.9805 19.9805 39.9610 
4 26.6667 26.6667 53.333 
5 9 51 60 
6 14.2930 45.707 60 
 
Total cost is 5882.6 €. As one can notice, congestion and different nodal prices 
occur in second, fifth and sixth hour. Line shadow prices for the congested line, in 
all three cases, are 30€/MW. When congestion occurs, owner of the Financial 
Transmission Right for the line 13 will be paid 30€/MW times the amount of 
reserved MW on the transmission line 13.  
There is also congestion of energy storage. As one can notice, in first and 
fourth hour, energy storage is charged at the maximum rate 10MW and shadow 
prices for power capacity right are 11.80 €/MW and 1.11 €/MW. In fifth hour energy 
storage is discharged at maximum rate of -9MW and shadow price is 3 €/MW. In 
fifth hour energy storage is full and the shadow price for energy capacity right is 
8.96 €/MWh.  
Because of congestion and price differences in system, payment collected from 
load exceeds payment to generators. ISO has 5717.4 € surplus. Amount of 5400 € is 
reserved for FTRs owners and 317.4 € for Storage Rights owners (161.26 € for power 
capacity right and 156.14 € for energy capacity right).  
If someone holds the transmission right for line 13 in second, fifth or sixth 
hour, he will be paid 30€ for each MW he owns. If storage right owner holds the 
right for power and energy capacity in fifth hour, he will be paid 3€/MW for 
reserved charging MW and 8.96€/MWh for reserved MWh. 
 
4.3. 30-bus system 
 
30-bus system is shown in Figure 7: 





Figure 7 30-bus system [17] 
There are 6 generators in the system located at buses 1, 2, 13, 22, 23 and 27. 
Generators’ cost functions are given in Table XXIV: 
Table XXIIIV Generators’ cost function 








Energy storages are located at buses 3 and 30. Storage parameters (charge 
and discharge rate limit, energy capacity, charge and discharge loss coefficient and 
energy leakage coefficient) are given in Table XXV: 




















S3 20 -15 100 0.98 1 0.98 
S30 15 -20 100 0.98 1 0.98 
 
Load is shown in Table XXVI: 




Table XXVI Load characteristics 





1 523.60 9 652.70 17 751.50 
2 458.40 10 723.80 18 773.40 
3 428.10 11 749.10 19 789.40 
4 404.90 12 800.00 20 855.50 
5 404.20 13 809.30 21 910.80 
6 421.40 14 779.60 22 897.80 
7 433.50 15 758.30 23 852.70 
8 498.90 16 740.60 24 756.50 
 
Line parameters (reactance and thermal limit) are shown in Table XXVII: 
Table XXVII Line parameters 















1 1 2 0.26 87 22 12 13 0.22 80 
2 1 3 0.19 112 23 12 14 0.13 60 
3 2 4 0.17 120 24 12 15 0.27 60 
4 2 5 0.24 90 25 12 16 0.21 50 
5 2 6 0.20 130 26 14 15 0.28 50 
6 3 4 0.18 95 27 15 18 0.27 60 
7 4 6 0.24 95 28 15 23 0.15 65 
8 4 12 0.22 90 29 16 17 0.22 50 
9 5 7 0.28 70 30 18 19 0.20 50 
10 6 7 0.24 75 31 19 20 0.18 50 
11 6 8 0.21 70 32 21 22 0.27 80 
12 6 9 0.56 95 33 22 24 0.33 50 
13 6 10 0.21 70 34 23 24 0.38 50 
14 6 28 0.11 70 35 24 25 0.21 55 
15 8 28 0.26 70 36 25 26 0.40 55 
16 9 11 0.24 75 37 25 27 0.42 90 
17 9 10 0.26 75 38 27 28 0.60 55 
18 10 20 0.13 60 39 27 29 0.45 50 
19 10 17 0.20 60 40 27 30 0.20 50 
20 10 21 0.20 60 41 29 30 0.30 55 
21 10 22 0.19 65 - - - - - 
 
The results are shown in Figure 8: 





Figure 8 Load and generation curve 
As one can notice that in the first, second and third hour generation is equal 
to the demand. Because system contains energy storages, from fourth to eighth 
hours generators produce more energy (demand is low and cheap generators can 
produce more energy to save money in the future when demand will be higher and 
system will need to use more expensive generators). Saved energy is discharged 
from storages during tenth, eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth hour. During four 
hours before daily peak, generators also produce more energy and then during 
twenty-first, twenty-second and twenty-third hour storages are discharged again.  
Line 1 (between bus 1 and 2) is congested during the whole day and line 2 
(between bus 1 and 3) is congested from thirteenth to twenty-fourth hour. When 
congestion occurs, there are differences between nodal prices and generators are 
redispatched from optimal production to satisfy line thermal limit. Line shadow 
price for line 1 and line 2 are shown in Table XXVIII and Table XXIX: 
Table XXVIII Shadow prices for line 1 
Hour €/MW Hour €/MW Hour €/MW 
1 3.62 9 5.15 17 4.94 
2 2.91 10 5.67 18 4.89 
3 2.66 11 5.92 19 4.84 
4 2.62 12 6.46 20 4.95 
5 2.51 13 6.32 21 4.61 
6 2.61 14 5.68 22 4.71 
7 2.70 15 5.89 23 4.28 
8 3.50 16 5.19 24 5.94 
 
Table XXVIII Shadow prices for line 2 
Hour €/MW Hour €/MW 
13 1.31 19 5.79 
14 2.52 20 7.64 
15 1.02 21 10.52 




16 2.64 22 9.94 
17 3.82 23 9.64 
18 4.80 24 0.84 
 
Charging and discharging at bus 3 is shown in Figure 9 and state of charge 
during the day in Figure 10: 
 
Figure 9 Charging and discharging – Storage 3 
 
Figure 10 State of charge – Storage 3 
Energy capacity is 100 MWh and, as we can see in Figure 10, storage is never 
full. Storage is charging in fifth, sixth, seventh and eight hour at maximum rate 
and is discharging in ninth, tenth, twelfth, thirteenth, twenty-first and twenty-
second hour at maximum rate. Owner of the power capacity right will collect for 
each hour price shown in Table XXX times reserved MW of charging/discharging 
capacity. 




Table XXIX Price for power capacity right – Storage 3 
Hour 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 21 22 
PCR 
(€/MW) 0.0089 0.2627 0.5593 0.2393 0.0494 0.1271 0.0098 0.1756 0.7442 0.0053 
Charging and discharging at the bus 30 is shown in Figure 11 and state of 
charge during the day in Figure 12: 
 
Figure 11 Charging and discharging – Storage 30 
 
Figure 12 State of charge – Storage 30 
Storage is charging at maximum rate during the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh 
and eight hour and is discharging at the maximum rate during tenth and twelfth 
hour. Owner of a power capacity right will collect revenue as shown in Table XXXI 
times reserved amount of MW: 
Table XXXI  Price for power capacity right – Storage 30 
Hour 4 5 6 7 8 10 12 
PCR (€/MW) 0.1597 0.4099 0.6638 0.9625 0.5375 0.1063 0.0734 




4.4. Auction for Power Capacity Rights 
 
The objective of the auction is to maximize profit. Bidders submit their offers 
for charging and discharging capacity they want to reserve and the price they are 
willing to pay. If charging and discharging for each hour are at the lower level than 
rate limits, bidders will get their maximum amount of preferred right and do not 
need to pay for those rights because there are still more rights that can be awarded. 
Maximum desirable capacity for charging has a positive sign and for discharging a 
negative sign.  
Energy storage is empty in the beginning and it is characterized by energy 
capacity, charge and discharge rate limits and energy leakage coefficient. There is 
no charge and discharge loss coefficients. As charging and discharging have 
opposite sign and they are simultaneously feasible, more rights can be awarded. 
Dual variables are related to charge and discharge rate limits. For the purpose of 
this model, it is assumed that charging and discharging is the same variable. If the 
variable is positive, the storage is charging, and if it is negative, storage is 
discharging. 
 
4.5. Auction example 
 
Storage energy capacity is 60 MWh, energy leakage coefficient is 0.9, charge 
and discharge rate limits are 15 MW and -10 MW. Storage is operating for four 
hours.  
There are three bidders (𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, and 𝑎𝑎3) competing for charging capacity and 
two bidders for discharging capacity (𝑏𝑏1 and 𝑏𝑏2). Their prices and desirable power 
capacity are shown in Table XXXII and Table XXXIII: 
Table XXXII Bidding prices (€/MW) 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 
Hour 1 0 6 7 5 8 
Hour2 8 5 3 4 2 
Hour 3 0 0 5 5 15 
Hour 4 4 6 2 10 5 
 
Table XXXIII Desirable charging and discharging capacity (MW) 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 
Hour 1 0 14 12 -7 -8 
Hour2 12 10 11 -8 -5 
Hour 3 0 0 8 -10 -10 
Hour 4 10 12 10 -5 -10 




Awarded charging and discharging capacity is shown in Table XXXIV: 
Table XXXIIIV Awarded charging and discharging capacity (MW) 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 
Hour 1 0 14 12 -7 -8 
Hour2 12 10 6 -8 -5 
Hour 3 0 0 8 -8 -10 
Hour 4 10 12 8 -5 -10 
 
As one can see, bidder 𝑎𝑎3 did not get desirable amount of charging capacity in 
second and fourth hour because storage is charging at the rate limit 15 MW (red 
color in the Table XXXIV shows the differences between desirable and awarded 
amount of MW). Shadow price for second and fourth hour is 3 €/MW and 2 €/MW. In 
the third hour storage is discharging at rate limit -10 MW and discharging shadow 
price for third hour is 5 €/MW. In the first hour, storage is not congested and every 
bidder gets desirable capacity without paying for that right (there are still more 
rights that can be awarded). Table XXXV shows how much each bidder has to pay 
for awarded capacity rights: 
Table XXXIV Payment (€) 
Bidder a1 a2 a3 b1 b2 
Hour 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Hour2 36 30 18 24 15 
Hour 3 0 0 40 40 50 





When transmission lines are congested, differences in LMPs occur. Low-cost 
generators power is reduced (or are shut down) and high-cost generators are 
redispatched. Generators sell energy at one price and load buys at the different one. 
Payments which ISO collects from loads exceed payment to generators and the 
surplus ISO collects during congestion can be awarded to the market participants to 
hedge against congestion charges and price volatility. FTRs are financial 
instrument that enables market participants to avoid risk in price differences. 
Market players can require FTRs in the auction process (annual, monthly or daily 
auction) or via bilateral contracts. Once FTRs are awarded in auction, they can 
easily be traded in different auctions or bilateral contracts. Market players can 
require FTRs to avoid paying extra cost due to congestion or make profit by 
reserving some amount of MW (because FTRs are based on reserved amount of MW, 
not actual MW delivered). This means that everyone can participate in FTRs 
auction or bilateral contracts to increase their profit. For have more FTRs awarded, 




market participants need to act strategically. This means they will change their 
bidding prices or even submit offers for other flowgates or point-to-point rights.  
Energy storage are sources of flexibility and reliability, they enable lower 
operating cost in the power system and decrease generation during daily’s peaks. 
Storages usually profit through intertemporal arbitrage (load shifting and peak 
shaving). Storages can be compared to transmission lines. Transmission lines move 
power spatially and storages move power forward in time. When storages are 
congested, owners of power and energy capacity rights (together known as financial 
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